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ABSTRACT:Railroading has been a troubled industry for half a
century. The troubles have approached the crisis stage once again
during the past few years. Much of the railroad system in the industrial
heartland of the nationeast of Chicago and north of the Potomac and
Ohio riversis in bankruptcy. These bankruptcies, furthermore, are
not yielding to the traditional solution of financial reorganizations. The
rate of return on the investment of Classrailroads eveninthe
"prosperous" south and west has averaged only about 3.6 percent
per year during the past six years. The recent surge in railroad traffic,
causing ton-miles to attain all-time peaks, has not generated a corre-
sponding improvement in profits, thus causing railroad managements
and analysts to speak of their "profitless boom"! This gives rise to fears
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4)that another economic recessionmay send more railroads into bank-
ruptcy. ¶ The origins of the railroad problem reside in thesimple tact
that the economy is expanding inareas that do not typically produce
much new traffic of a type suitedto conventional rail transport.
Competition from trucking, other specializedmodes of transport, and
transport alternatives (such as high voltagetransmission of electricity,
synthetic materials, and recycling ofwaste materials) are further cir-
cumscribing the demand for rail freightservice. ¶ The railroads have
also suffered productivity problems,caused in part by these shifts in
the freight market. Employmentin the industry has declined by nearly
two thirds during the postwar period,enabling the industry to record
gains in labor productivityas great or greater than the average for
private industry. However, to achievethis reduction in labor inputs,
the industry has had to maintainor slightly increase its employment of
capital; as a result, railroad capitalproductivity, the ratio of outputto capital inputs, has shownno growth or has even declined slightly.
Total or multiple factor productivitymeasures that combine labor and
capital inputs suggest that railroads'overall productivity gains have
been no higher and perhapslower than the average forprivate industry.
[11 INTRODUCTION: BASICFINANCIAL TRENDS
Railroading in the UnitedStates has beena troubled industry for halfa century. In this paperan attempt is made to documentwhat those troubles have been and whythey may have occurred.To the degree possible,the emphasis throughout ison the quantitatje facts ofthe United States rail industry's situation duringthe post-World WarII years. These factsare supplemented asnecessary by qualitativeconsiderations and basic histori- cal trends within theindustry and thesurrounding economicenvironment. Since railroads in theUnited Statesare still private firms ina market economy, it seems sensibleto start with theprofitability or earnings record of the enterprisesinvolved. Table 1 showsthe earnings of ClassI railroad companies from railroadoperations and from othersources for the last four decades.1 A distinctlong-run decline innet railway operatingincome has occurred and beenpartially offset byan upward trend inincome from other sources. Thegradual upward trendin "other income"reflects the accelerated developmentof the extensivereal estate andmineral rights of railroads and thediversification of railroadcompanies into other industries. The profitability ofrail operations alone(exclusive of otherincome) can be measured by what is callednet railway operatingincome (NROI), shownin column 2 of Table 1.In addition to therather sharp downwardcourse of net
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srailway operating income over the postwar period, there is a strong in-phase
cyclical component. Most significantly, operating income hit successively
lower levels during the recessions of 1954, 1958, 1961, and 1970. Net
investment in transportation property, including cash and materials invento-
ries,3 is shown in column 5 of Table i and the rate of return on this invest-
ment (column 2 ± column 5) is shown in column 6.
Compared to more recent years, 1972 was a "good year" for the railroad
industry. Yet the return of 2.95 percent puts railroads next to the last
among 62 industries ranked according to rate of return on networth in
1972; their return on equity of 3 percent is less than one-third that for all
private industry (10.5 percent).' In only five of the years since 1947 has rail
rate of return exceeded 4 percent, and the most recent of those years is
1955. Since 1955 the rate of return has exceeded 3 percent in only six out
of 16 years, and the most recent of those years is1966. Because net
investment in transportation property displays a modest growth over the
postwar period, the rate of return exhibits an even sharper downward trend
than net railway operating income.6
The earnings performance of the railroad industry portrayed in the
foregoing statistics is, of course, considerably influenced by the low profits
or actual losses of the northeast railroads. Forexample, the losses of six
deficit eastern carriers reduced net income of the rail industry by $386
million in 1970 and by $321 million in 1971. Table 2, showing the rate of
return by district, reveals thatitis primarily the mounting problems of
ailing railroads in the northeast that have caused the rate of return for the
entire industry to decline over the postwar period. However, a low rate of
return on investment is not unique to eastern district roads. The railroadsof
the southern district have maintained a rate of return in the range of only
4-5 percent and 1972 was the first year since 1956 that a 5 percent return
was achieved. Western district roads havemaintained a return in the
2.5-4 percent range, with a 4 percent return exceeded since 1952 only in
1966 and 1972.
The low earnings of the industry also can be attributed partially to
deficit-producing passenger operations, only recently relieved by the trans-
fer of these services to AMTRAK. The passenger-service deficit, as calcu-
lated by the ICC yearly since 1963, is shown in the fourth and fifth
columns of Table 3. The addition of these amounts to the net railway
operating income figures in Table 2 would attenuate, but by no means
reverse, the profit decline. In fact, in terms of total deficit(column 5), the
passenger loss has been static or slightly dechning since thelate 1960s.
Net railway operating income, moreover, may actually overstate the
earning power of the rail industry. In computing net railway operating
income, the consumption of capitalis measured by depreciation and
amortization computed according to service lives specified by the ICC.
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9ncludes Pocohontas r.gion.
These accruals, in theview of many experts,understate the actual lossof value of the railroadplant. For one thing,the service livesaccorded roadway and equipmentare rather long, and much ofrail investment has become economicallyobsolete before it has beenfully depreciated inthe accounts. In addition, becauseof the typically longservice lives of rail assets and the continuinginflation in the U.S.economy, cost of replace- ment often substantiallyexceeds originalcost. As in other industries, inclusion at replacementcosts would increasedepreciation accrualsap- preciably; in the railroadindustry, with itsexceptionally longaccounting periods for depreciationhowever, the effectiveunderstatement basedon historical costsmay be considerably largerthan for most otherindustries.










1929 5.30 6.03 4.27 4.85
1939 2.56 3.14 2.77 1.85
1944 4.70 4.37 5.45 4.82
1947 3.44 3.02 3.52 3.84
1950 4.28 3.63 5.31 4.63
1951 3.76 3.47 4.74 3.76 1952 4.16 3.86 5.27 4.13
1953 4.19 4.01 5.45 3.98 1954 3.28 2.39 4.48 3.29
1955 4.22 4.19 5.45 3.86 1956 3.95 4.05 5.00 3.54 1957 3.36 3.29 4.14 3.18 1958 2.76 2.00 3.68 3.20 1959 2.72 2.27 3.63 2.87
1960 2.13 1.55 2.97 2.40 1961
1962
1.97 0.89 3.19 2.58
1963
2.74 1.80 4.17 3.15
1964
3.12 2.28 4.04 3.60
3.16 2.56 4.01 3.43
1965
1966
3.69 3.32 4.16 3.87
1967
3.90 3.55 4.45 4.03
1968
2.46 1.53 3.86 2.75
1969
2.44 1.27 3.79 3.01 2.36 1.10 4.17 2.81
1970
1971
1.73 def. 4.50 3.02
1972 est.
2.47 del. 4.93 3.90 2.95 0.44 5.17 4.19I,'
TABLE 3Passenger Service Deficit, 1963-1971
(in millions)
Passenger Service
Expenses, Taxes, Passenger Service
Passenger and Rents Deficit
Service Solely Solely
Year Revenues Relateda Total Relateda Total
lJnder accounting niles prescribed by the ICC, railroad operating revenues and expenses are divided into
freight and passenger services so as to develop a net railway operating income for each service 'Solely
related passenger service expenses" are expenses incurred directly irs the provision of passenger service
and which could be avoided if passenger service were discontinued. "lotal passenger expenses" also
include common and joint expenses that have been apportioned statistically between freight and
passenger service and which could not necessarily be avoided if passenger service alone were discon-
tinued, but which in all likelihood ssould be largely avoided ifit were.
[2] THE CHANGING MARKET FOR RAIL FREIGHT TRANSPORT
Obviously, there can be little doubt that the U.S. railroad industry has not
been highly profitable in recent decades. Of the many reasons advanced to
explain this condiiion, unquestionably one of the most important is simply
the changing character of the intercity freight market. Changing markets
characterize the American economy, and the success of an industry
depends in no small way on its ability to adapt the product it offers to
changing demands. The freight market, like other markets, is subject to
change and the problems of the railroad industry owe in large measure to
its not being able to adapt to changing market conditions, in terms of both
the types of services it provides and the manner in which it produces those
services.
As an economy matures, the evolution of consumption patterns and
industrial activity causes the overall importance of materials to decline and
the relative importance of various commodities to change. The volume of
freight, particularly freight of a type suited to rail transport, normally fails to
grow in proportion to the rate of economic growth. In gross terms,
aggregate intercity freight tonnage has been growing only about 60 per-
cent as fast as real GNP during the postwar period. The geographic
distribution of economic activity also changes over time, partiallyin
response to the changing composition of economic activity and partially in
1963 $1,107 $1,116 $1,506 $9 $399
1964 1,085 1,103 1,496 18 410
1965 1,042 1,086 1,463 44 421
1966 1,018 1,048 1,417 31 400
1967 878 1,016 1,363 138 485
1968 686 884 1,172 198 486
1969 638 863 1,102 225 464
1970 586 837 1,062 252 477
1971 407 522 692 115 285S
response to the changing character of the transportsystem. This rekcation
of industry and marketstransforms the spatial pattern of freightflows,
sometimes in ways that deprive the railroadsof traffic and alter the
densities of remaining rail traffic.The railroads participate,therefore, in what is inherentlya slow-growth market and oftenan increasingly less
profitable one as well.
Bulk-Commodity Traffic
It is useful to divide freighttraffic into two categories: bulkcommodities and manufactures. Bulkcommodities are raw materialsor "intermediate"
(or "producers") goods intransit from raw-materialorigin to factoryor between factories. Bulkcommodities tend to be handled inflows rather than in discrete, packagedunits, and they tend tomove in large volumes. The commoditiesthemselves are usually denseor "heavy" and of rela- tively low valueper unit weight. Theyare typically not fragile,perishable nor particularly subject todepreciation in market valuewith time. The railroads' archcompetitors for bulk-commoditytraffic, on a cost basis,are the water carrier and thepipeline, though the relativelyhigh-cost truck has made surprising inroadsinto even this trafficin certain specialcases. The economicconsumption of bulk commoditieshas not keptpace with the growth ofnational product. Thepostwar growth in totalconsumption of raw materials otherthan primaryConstruction materials (sand,gravel, and stone for directuse in construction), andair and water, hasgrown at an average rate o only1 .9 percent peryear during the postwarperiod, half or so the growth rate ofabout 4.0 percentin real GNP.Furthermore the long-rurtrendis for the growthrate of raw materialconsumption to decline relativeto the growth rateof real GNP.
The explanationof this trendseems to lie in evolvingconsumption patterns and in advancingindustrial technologyFor consumptionincre- ments to per capitaincome are increasinglydevoted to thepurchase of services such as healthcare, personal services,education,entertainment travel,communj-ation etc., ratherthan goods.Services typicallyrequire a lesser weight ofphysicalmaterials per unit ofoutput than manufacturing and constructionSpecifically, the totalshare of realGNP allocatedto goods as opposedto services fellfrom 60.8percent in 1945 to 48.1 percent in 1970.
Even amongmanufactured goods,incremental personalincome is de- voted increasinglyto goods relativelymore labor- and thanmaterialjntensjve Aspersonal incomesrise,consuners typically spend smallerfractions of theirIncomes on suchbasic commoditiesas food, clothing,furniture, shelter,and fuel and largerfractions on such highlyfabrjcatedproducts astelevisions,stereo sets,cameras, watches,
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JohnR. Meyer and Alexander I.Morionjewelry, toiletries, and cosmetics, for which weight is much lowerin
relation to value. The 50 manufacturing industriesamong the 41 7 four-
digit SIC manufacturing industries exhibiting the highestrates of growth
from 1958 to 1966 have freight input coefficients (as taken from the
Department of Commerce's 1963 Input-Output table) averaging onlyone-
half the weighted average freight input coefficient (0.02204) of all 417
manufacturing industries. In fact, as Table 4 reveals, only fouramong the
50 fastest-growing industries have freight input coefficients equalto or
exceeding the 0.02204 average for all manufacturing.
Another change in consumer expenditure patterns inhibiting material
consumption is the tendency of consumers to substitutemore expensive
brands, models, and styles of individual productsas their personal incomes
rise. The weight of materials used in producingmore expensive brands,
models, and styles of commodities suchas food, clothing, cars, furniture,
appliances, and housewares rarely rises in proportion to the value of these
products: in some products, weight does not rise with valueat all.8
Progress in industrial technology also retards the growth of material
usage. Economies in material usage are achieved in diverse ways, among
them the substitution of lighter materials, development of synthetics,
creation of more durable materials, miniaturization, improved product
design, improved process design,new uses for by-products, waste and
scrap, and improved inventory and distribution systems that reduce inven-
tory "shrinkage." Even innovations less directly motivated bya desire to
economize on materials and their transport neverthelessmay have had
such an effect. For example, nuclear energy replaces heavier fuels; radio,
television, telephones, and computers are substitutes for "paper" forms of
communication; airplanes and communication satellites require fewer
ground structures and construction and utilize lighter equipment than their
predecessors.
The extent to which material-economizing innovationsas well as the
shifts to more highly fabricated products and tomore expensive brands and
styles have retarded the growth of materialusage within individual indus-
tries is summarized in Table 5. The table contrasts theaverage annual
growth of primary raw material inputs (in units of weight) for each of16
major industries with the growth of each industry's output (as measured by
the respective F.R.B. index of industrial productionor some other index of
industry output). In every case but one, output hasgrown more rapidly
than the physical weight of inputs arid, by implication, the physical weight
of outputs.
Of course, volume and compositionare not the only dimensions rele-
varit to defining a traffic market. The spatial pattern also is important.
Indeed, total ton-miles of traffic could increaseeven if volume declines, if
miles traveled per physical unit rose by more than enough to offset the














3672Cathode ray picture tubes
3674Semiconductors
3571Computing and related mach.






































































0.01393 3693X-ray & therapeuticapparatus 2282Throwing and windingmills
3799Transportation equip.,N.E.C.










0.01368 2295Coated fabric,not rubberized
3545Machine toolaccessories















SOURCE:U.S. Deparrrnenr of Commerce, !ndosry Profiles, i958-r 966(L'S. Governnsenr Prinring Office,
1968); and U.S. Deparrment olCornmerce, Input-Output Structure ofthe U.S. Economy. (963
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963).
tonnage drop. The geographic organization of economic activity does, of
course, adapt itself to changes in the economy. To start, manufacturing is
becoming more market-oriented,for many reasons. For example, man-
ufacturers usually ship bulk commodities rather than finishedgoods be-
cause of the lower freight rates for bulk corrlfnodities.bo Similarly, the shift
in competitive emphasis from price to style and serviceencourages pro-
ducers to locate as close to marketsas possible. The concentration of
people, and therefore of demand, in large metropolitanareas makes it
easier to achieve economies of scale in manufacturing inmore and more
regions, thus making decentralization anda market-oriented location in-
creasingly feasible.
Another factor tending to lengthen hauls of bulk commoditiesis increas-
ing geographic specialization in the production of materials. Thevarious
regions of the nation are not uniformly endowed with naturalresources. As
freight rates decline, it becomes economical fora market to draw on ever
more distant raw material sources. In particular, the decline in freight rates
with distance has encouraged the use ofmore distant, low-cost raw material
sources. The United States has thereby progressed from aneconomy in
which local areas were nearly self-sufficient in producingtheir own raw
material needs to one of regional self-sufficiency (in which therewas
Growth Ratio









3341Secondary non-ferrous metals 2.36 0.05940
3351Copper roIling and drawing 2.35 0.02630
2256Knit fabric mills 2.35 0.009 19
3713Truck and bus bodies 2.33 0.0 1420
358XService industry machines, N.E.C. 2.33 0.01 302
2327Separate trousers 2.30 0.00511
2844Toilet preparations 2.29 0.01295
3542Metal-forming machine tools 2.29 0.00894
3559Special industry machinery, N.E.C. 2.27 0.00927
3572Typewriters 2.24 0.0082 1
3569General industry machinery, N.E.C. 2.23 0.00684
3451Screw machine products 2.23 0.01246
3694Engine electrical equipment 2.21 0.0 1068
All manufacturing 1.65 0.02204TABLE 5Growth of Primary Raw Material Inputs (in tons) Compared
with Growth of Output (as measured by F.R.B. indexesof
industrial production), 1947-1 967, by industry
Sector or Industry
(in order of declining













































SOURCE:Alexancr L Morton, 'Freight Demand,"Ph.D. dissertatiwi Harvard Univeity(unpubIish Chapter 5.
The index used us the CompositeIndex of (Ten) Construction Materials,
published by the Construction and Building Materials Divison of theDepartment of Commerce. The tenmaterials are weighted ri relationto value, so that the fapid growthof sand, gravel, and stoneconSumption affecix the index less sharply than otherwise
rsirnple average of theF.R.B. production indexes of the(Our categories.
considerable trade withinregions, but regionsthemselves tended to be self-sufficient) and presentlyto one of considerableregional iriterdepen- dence (in whichmany raw materialsare produced in whicheverareas of the Country havea comparative advantage).Indeed, many important commodities, includingCitrus and other freshfruits, and vegetables,grain, meat, lumber, ironore, coal, and petroleumare supplied throughout the nation from theone or two regions inwhich theyare produced most cheaply.










2.8 3.4lengthening hauls of bulk commodities. Thisprocess of exhaustion and
discovery of new sources at more remote locations isor has been at work
in the case of coal, petroleum, iron ore, lumber, and soil fertility. Increas-
ing geographic specialization and the exhaustion of older sources of supply
have generally pushed production of raw materials into the west and the
south. Most of the traffic growth arising from the lengthening of hauls has,
therefore, occurred in these regions.
For those commodities already produced in but oneor two areas of the
U.S., regional specialization alreadyis well developed, implying that
additional lengthening of domestic hauls of these commodities is improba-
ble. Further geographic specialization, if it occurs, ismore likely to be on
an international scale. Although the effect of expanding international trade
on the demand for domestic intercity freight will depend on the types of
goods and services exchanged, it may be generally negative. Exports of
bulk commodities have only to reach ihe nearest port. As for imports, to
the extent that the population is increasingly concentrated in metropolitan
belts extending along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, and around the
Great Lakes, all accessible by ship,imports of bulk commodities and
manufactured goods received in trade can be delivered toan increasing
proportion of American markets without a long domestic intercity overland
haul.
Although intercity hauls of commodities generally seem to be longer,
intercity movements of some commodities can become shorter, or even be
eliminated altogether, for various reasons. For example, in some industrial
sectors certain materials can be substituted for others and these substituted
materials may have very different accessibility characteristicssomemay
originate at great distances whereas others may be available nearby. Thus,
the construction industry can choose among concrete, metals, lumber, and
synthetics as structural materials, as insulating materials, and as facingor
surfacing materials, and these substitutions can be sensitive to differential
freight costs, just as they are sensitive to cost differentials in general.
Similarly, electric utilities may switch fuels, so that differences in cost,
including freight charges, may alter the choice among,say, nuclear, oil,
pipelined natural gas, rail transported coal, or hydroelectric or mine mouth
generation (with subsequent high voltage transmission). Obviously, not
only the total distance and volume of transport involved, but the modal
choice will be sensitive to which of these alternatives is selected.
Recycling of used materials presents industry with another opportunity
for shortening or even eliminating some intercity freight hauls, for recycled
materials substitute for virgin materials that typically must be brought to the
market over long distances. Recycling ispresently limitedto minor
amounts of metals, paper, rubber, and industrial chemicals, although it
appears probable that the proportions of materials recycled will increase
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and that recycling will be extended to other commodities, suchas heat
energy, as the technology is developed. Rising prices oi virgin materialsas
resources are depleted and increasing concern over the environmental
impact of waste disposal also can be expected to encouragerecycling.
Good estimates of the net effect of all these conflicting influenceson the
length of haul for bulk commodities during the postwaryears are difficult
to ascertain. The average length of haul for all rail trafficapparently has
grown from approximately 411 miles in 1947 to 488 miles in 1967,or at
an annual rate of 0.9 percent per year.'1 This average, of course,represents
both movements of bulk and manufactured commodities.For watercar-
riers and pipelines, which are more heavily specialized in themovement of
bulk commodities than railroads, annual growthrates in average length of
haul in postwar years have been 0.2percent and 0.9 percent, respective-
ly.2 It is difficultto believe that the length of haul of rail bulkcommodities
has increased at a rateany more rapid than that for pipelines duringthese
postwar years. This would suggest that the overallrate of growth in length
of rail haul of 0.9 percentper year, which is essentially identical with that
for pipelines, would bea reasonable estimate of the actual rate of increase
in bulk-commodity trip lengthsover the postwar period. Assuming thisto be the case, this 0.9percent growth per year in length of haulwould
constitute almost one-half of the remaininggap between real U.S. GNP
growth, approximately 4.0percent per year during the postwaryears, and
the average 1.9percent per year growth in total physicaltonnage volume.
in short, lengthening of haulshas probably increased theactual rate of growth in total rail bulkton-miles of traffic during thepostwar years by
approximately 50 percent, but thisis still not enough to bringthe rate of increase in this marketup to parity with the rate of increasein real GNP.
Traffic in Manufactures
The other majorcategory of freight traffic,manufactures consists primarily of finished goods,or parts, moving from factoryto assembly plant, warehouse, or store.Manufactures typicallymove in packages or discrete units; shipments tendto be of lower volume,smaller and less regular,than bulk-commodity flows.The goods themselvestend to be of lower density (i.e., lighter) and of highervalue per unit ofweight. They frequentlyare fragile or perishableand subject to lossof market valueas a function ot time. This trafficaccounts for 25-40percent of railroad ton-miles(depend- ing on definition)and a still largerproportion of revenues andprofits. Obviously, theweight of manufacturedgoods must bearsome reason- ably constantrelation to the weightof raw materialinputs. Accordingly, the weight of traffic inmanufactures almostcertainly has beengrowing more slowly than realGNP. However,itis significant thataggregate intercity
462 John R. Meyer and Alexander 1.. Mortorfreight tonnage in both bulk commodities and manufactures has been
growing at a rate about 60 percent as fast as real GNP during thepostwar
period whereas, as already mentioned, the rate of increase in bulkcom-
modities alone has been growing only about 50percent as quickly as real
GNP. The discrepancy of 10 percent in growth rates between bulkcom-
modity and total commodity tonnage suggestssome increased activity in
manufactured goods traffic.
The primary cause of this relatively faster growth in manufactured goods
traffic tonnage would appear to be an increasen the number of shipments.
For example, as per capita incomes rise, there isa shiftin consumer
expenditures toward products thatpass through a greater number of stages
of fabrication.13 Increasing specializationor'division of labor" in man-
ufacturing industry also contributes toa rising number of interplant ship-
rnents. Hence, the total tonnage of manufactured goods shippedmay rise
more rapidly than bulk commodity tonnage. The proliferation of distinct
brands, models, and styles of manufacturesmay also reduce the size of
individual shipments and require a more elaborate system of distribution.
It is not so much in tons or ton-miles, however, as in freightrevenues
that the faster growth of trafficin manufactures than in bulk can be
discerned (i.e., in greater revenue per ton-mile). Aggregate intercity freight
revenues have been growing about 86 percent as fast as current dollar
GNP and the relationship would not seem to be significantly altered ifone
uses price deflated or real values (since the deflators for freight revenues
and GNP are not too dissimilar). Freightrevenues from bulk commodities
have apparently grown roughly in proportion to bulk-commoditytonnages,
economies in bulk handling apparently offsetting the cost of slightly longer
hauIs.'Accordingly, the greater growth in total revenues than in total
tonnage has derived chiefly from traffic in manufactures.
An increase in the quality of freight service used is the major explanation
of these differential growth rates between tonnage andrevenues. A funda-
mental change in the postwar freight market is the increasingly higher
standards of service that shipments of manufactures require. This change
parallelsand, in large part, derives froma shift in most markets toward
higher-quality products and services. As the economy shifts to production
of more highly fabricated goods and more expensive brands, models, and
styles, the value of manufactures per unit of weight tends to rise because of
the relatively greater inputs of labor and capital. As the amount andcost of
working capital tied up in goods rises, there isa tendency to opt for
speedier, more reliable deliveries as a way of controlling logistical costs.
Growing sophistication among shippers concerning the trade-offs between
transport and other components of the total distribution bill also is partly
responsible for the gradual shift to higher-quality freight service.'5
Highly fabricated and expensive goods are inclined to be fragile, perish-
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able, or otherwise damage-proneprompting the USe of premiumtranspo,-t service. Greater stress on styling erodesrap!dly the market valueof many products, which also stimulatesdemand for speedy,reliable delivery
Increasingly, products compete in themarket on the basis ofquality and service as well as price. The reliability,speed, andconvenience of de- liveries is part o1 the qualityof service for whicha buyer or shipper looks.
Unfortunately for the railroads, theyhave not been wellequipped to meet this demand for higherservice standards. The easiestway of doct,
menting this point is to lookat the trends in intercity freightshares by the different carriers, shown inTable 6. The most importantstatistics in Table6 for evaluating trends inmanufactured-goods trafficare the relative perfor-
mance of rail and truck shares, sincethe truck isunquestionably the major competitor of rail for this traffic.Since the end of WorldWar II, truck ton-miles have increased fivefoldand the truck share ofthe total market has more than tripled;railroad ton-miles,on the other hand, havein- creased only slightly, ifat all, and the rail shareof the total markethas declined from roughlytwo-thirds to a little less than40 percent. Without much question, thesuperior growth performanceof the truckingindustry is in large partattributable to that industry'sbetter performancein meeting theincreasingly higherservice requirementsformanulacturedgoods traffic.
Changes in thespatial patterns of trafficand manufacturingalso may have handicappedthe railroads incompeting with trucks.Probably the most important changeis the urbanizationof the Americanpopulation The rural populationof the U.S. hasdeclined as apercentage of the total Population from 85percent in 1850 to 60percent in 1900, 36percent in 1950, and 25percent at present. Arural population,geographically disbursed about itsmanufacturing and distribution
centers, requires inter- city hauls fordistribution of itsconsumer goods. Much ofthe rural rail network wasconstructed to provide bothfreight andpassenger transporta- tion to ruralcommunities that, at thetime, hadno suitable alternative means of transport. Thedelivery ofconsumer goods toa rural population supplied the railroadswith traffic thatwas doubly valuable(1) because manufacture tend to berelatively high-rated(i.e., profitable)traffic; and (2) becausemanufactures can beback-hauled intorural communities while bulkcommodities are beingmoved out. As therural population has migrated to cities,this flow ofmanufactures hasdiminished relatively, causing much of therural railnetwork to becomesuperfluous Inessence, urbanization haseliminatedany semblance ofbalance betweenbulk commodity flowsout of ruralareas andmanufactured goodsback, a io-way traffic for whichthe all-purposerail boxcarwas uniquely well suited.
The growth oflarge urbanmarkets alsoencourages the decentralizationand market orientation of manufacturing, afactor that tends to shorten or
do away entirely with some intercity haulsof manufactures. Indeed, given
the strength of these demographic trends,itis somewhat sur)riSingthat
total manufactured-goods traffic hascontinued to grow as much as it has.
At any rate, the minimum efficientscale of production for manymanufac-
turing processes has not grown sorapidly as the size of the market in most
metropolitan areas."' Hence, an increasingproportion of the total market
for products is concentrated in citiesof a size sufficient to support their own
factories in an increasing portion of themanufacturing spectrum. That is,
metropolitan areas are becoming increasinglyself-sufficient in their local
manufacturing capacities.17 There is,accordingly, a tendency toward a
diminished flow of manufactured goods amongcities, ceteris paribus. The
traffic growth lost as a result ofsuch "import substitution"is again
relatively high-rated traffic. The flows alsotend to be of relatively high-
density, and therefore are less costly to move on aunit basis, since the
trafficis concentrated among a limitednumber of urban origins and
destinations.'8 Finally, to the extent thateach metropolitan area must
produce something in trade, these intercityflows tend to be somewhat
balanced as to back-haul.
This decentralization or regionalization (ormegapolitization) of man-
ufacturing, in concert with the migrationof population to the west and the
south, also is having an effect on theinterregional balance of traffic in
manufactures. Even after the discoveryand development of abundant
natural resources in the west and duringthe early westward migration of
markets, manufacturing remained highlyconcentratedin the "indus-
trialized northeast." This generated longhauls of raw materials into the
northeast and long hauls of manufacturesback to the west and the south.
It could only be a matter of timeuntil some manufacturing capacity
migrated in order to abbreviate this roundabouttraffic. The dispersion of
manufacturing away from the northeastthus contributes to lower traffic
volumes and the redundance of fixedrail plant in the northeast.
Concurrent with the migration fromrural to urban areas has been a
migration of population and industryfrom the central cities to the suburbs.
The population residing in the"outside-central-city" areas of the Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) grew at a ratehalf again as great as
the growth rate of the central cities between1930 and 1 950, three times as
great between 1950 and 1960and, itis estimated, will grow six times as
rapidly between 1965 and 1975,19 Commerce and industry are suburbaniz-
ing at about the same rate as thepopulation.2°
Suburbanization seems to be generallyadverse to the fortunes of the rail
industry. Railroads were built at aboutthe same time as cities were
expanding or forming, and cities in most caseseither grew up around rail
facilities or else rail terminals were built nearthe industrial cores of the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3John R. Meyer and AlexanderL. Morton
newly-forming cities. As long as cities remained denseand
clustered around the rail facilities on which theywere so depen(l(,lttraffic readily moved by rail.2Rail lines have not been extendedin most Cjti('Sto
serve emerging suburban areas as completely and efficientlyas they Serve
the central business district and, indeed, probablycould not befor technological reasons. Suburbanization, therefore,tends to carryconsum
ers, warehouses, and factories away from rail service.22Furthermorein choosing among possible suburban locations,factories, warehousesand shopping centers are sometimesmore concerned today with locatingalong highways for ease ofaccess by employees and customers thanthey are with locating along rail lines.
Not only does suburbanization reduce theProportion of shipmentswith origins .and destinations having readyor efficient access to rail,it also
transforms the pattern of movementsto a pattern for which tilerail network and conventional trainoperations are not well suited.Formerlythe distribution pattern for manufacturedgoods tended to beradial, outward from urban manufacturingcities to satellite cities andtowns, thus Parallel- ing the rail network. Thepresent trend is towardmovements of manufac-
tured goods that originateat one suburban point andterminate at other suburban points scattered aboutthe metropolitanarea. This emerging
distribution pattern is less radial,more dispersed and 'random,"with an increasing number ofshipments movingover trans-suburbanroutes not paralleled by raillines and lacking the densityfor conventionaltrain Operations




Productivity growthmeasures theimprovement over theyears inthe efficiency withwhich an industry
converts its factors ofproduction into asalable service or product. In an environment in whichcompeting iridus-
tries are achieving significant productivity gains,an industry whose pro-
ductivity lags normally findsitdifficult to simultaneously match wage
increases in other industries, keep its prices stableto fend off competition
from other products and services, and maintaina satisfactory rate of profit.
For example, when productivity lags, market-enforcedwage increases must
be translated into higher prices, which graduallycause demand to cease
growing and perhaps eventually to taper off. At thesame time, lagging
productivity and falling output putpressure on profits and the ability of any
industry to raise capital for renewal and modernization.Accordingly,
industry growth in output and productivity generallyare positively corre-
lated.
It is at least somewhat surprising, therefore, given thestatic character of
output growth in the railroad industry, that published studies of industry
productivity growth rates suggest that the railroad industryhas done quite
well by usual measures of productivity gain.Specifically, "net ton-miles
and passenger-miles per man-hour," the index(attributable to the U.S.
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics,or BLS) frequently used to
measure productivity in the transportation industries, hasgrown at an
average rate of 5.2 percent per year in the rail industry during the period
1 947i 970 (and 6.0 percent peryear between 1957 and 1970). During the
same period, the productivity of the private economyas a whole, mea-
sured as real net output per man-hour of labor, hasgrown at an average
rate of only 3 percent. According to these studies, then, the railroad
industry has generated productivity gainsat a rate 70 percent greater than
the rest of the economy.23 In addition, for the raIroads'major competitors,
output per unit of labor input rose only 3.1 percentper year in intercity
motor trucking and 0.7 percent per year in water transportationvs. 5.8
percent a year in railroading during the period 1948-1 966.24 Thequestion
thus arises, how have the railroads seemingly violatedthe usual rule
relating good productivity performanceto general industry growth and
prosperity?
At least one explanation may be that net ton-milesper man-hour is an
incomplete measure of overall rail productivity, at least forsome purposes.
To begin, rail labor inputs have declined muchmore rapidly than capital
inputs. In most industries capital has been substituted for laborover the last
few decades but this substitution has been especiallypronounced in the
rail industry. The capital-labor ratio increasedat an average rate of 2.6
percent per year in the private domestic economy during the period
1948_1966.?S In the rail industry the capital-labor ratio has increasedat an
average annual rate of about 4.7 percent during the same period.
Like capital inputs, inputs of materialsand services (or so-called "inter-
mediate" inputs) have tended to decline less rapidly thanlabor inputs in
the rail industry. Specialization isan important means of improving pro-
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ductivity, and the railroad industry has used thisdeviceextensilNot only has it increasingly employed relatively more
outside labor
servic but it also has turned increasingly to purchasingtheservices of
capital assets owned by others as an alternative to owning the
assets itselfThis k particularly evident in rolling stock. Although the
number of
railroad owned freight cars has been decreasing throughoutthePOStwaryears the number of cars leased by the railroads and thenumber ofcars Ownedby car companies and shippers have been increasinguntil ifl 1971
the latter accounted for roughly 18 percent of all freightcars.2In 1955
railroads built over half as many freight carsas the car-building
industry, butby 1971 they built only 15 percentas many.
Recorded man-hours may also understatethe growth ofiflp(j5 neededto produce current output whilemaintaining rail plantat givenstandards7 Financial stringencies have promptedsome rail companies
to economize on labor and other inputs by deferringmaintenance of their
properties and by allowing theaverage quality of the railplant todeteriorateThis "reduced-level" of maintenancemay be wise andproper in cases inwhich there is an excess of rail plantthat will neverneed to bereplaced.more generally,deferring maintenancemay simply postpone
e)(penses as- sociated with producingpresent output, therebycausing presentinputo be understated andproductivity gains to beoverstated 28
Ton-mileage might alsooverstate the output growthof the railindust This couldoccur because, among otherreasons, there has beena shift in the composition oftraffic toward thatwhich is inherentlyless costlyto produce and lessvaluable in themarket place. Themost impo,lant instance of this is thedecline ofpassenger service. Sincepassenger5 are several timesmore costly to producethan revenuefreight ton-rn iles the precipitousdecline ofPassenger traffic relativeto freight traffic has caused a reductionin averagecost per unit of thecomposite output usc-d by the B[S andothers. In additionvirtually all thegrowth inaggregate freight ton-mileagehas come fromthe growing lengthof freight hauls. As pointed outpreviously,average distanceper ton increased inrecent years_-.indeed, byapproximately 24percent between 1947 and1971. The marginal factorinput requjremof longer haulsis comparatively light,so that growthof ton-mileagestemming from longerhauls is a less costly increment tooutput thanone stemming fromadded shipments. Thus, if output weremeasured asrevenue tonnage ratherthan ton-mileage, measured Productivitygrowth between1947 and 1971would be roughly 24 percentless.
As ameasure of output
ton-mileage also doesnot reflect any deteriora- tion inquality ofservice thatmay be overtakingsome railroads. To the extent thata lower quality
of service isless costly toperform, the inputs needed toproduce a given































productivity measures to rise. Standards of rail service may have fallen in a
number of ways. Shippers, it is alleged, must wait longer for empty cars for
loading, and more often the cars on arrival are dirty or otherwise unsuit-
able for loading. Speed of delivery has shown little if any improvement
during the postwar period and may even have declined; the average
freight-car cycle time (the time elapsed between successive loadings of a
single car) has increased from 16.6 days in 1947 to 25.5 days in 1971, an
increase substantially in excess of the 24 percent rise in length of haul. The
incidence of loss and damage, another aggravation to shippers, has shown
a fairly steady upward trend. As a rough indicator, loss and damage claims
paid have risen from $98 million, or 1.1 percent of freight revenues, in
1955 to $235 million, or 2.0 percent of revenues, in 1971.
Sensitivity Tests of Productivity Measures
The standard measures of rail productivity can be modified or tested for
sensitivity to the various factors cited above. The first or most obvious of
these would be to adjust for the changing character of rail output. The unit
of rail output used by the BLS is a combined total of ton-miles and
passenger-miles in which a passenger-mile is said to be the equivalent of
roughly two freight ton-miles, corresponding to the fact that average rail
passenger revenue per passenger-mile is approximately twice the average
rail freight revenue per ton-mile. However, as stated in section 1, throughout
the postwar period passenger service has been a cross-subsidized and
deficit-producing operation, so the relative revenues of passenger and
freight operations fail to reflect their relative costs. Using standard ICC
formulas for apportioning operating expenses between freight service and
passenger service, passenger operating expenses per passenger-mile have
been estimated to be from five to nine times as great as freight operating
expenses per tonmile.29 Counti rig passenger-miles as the equivalent of five
rather than two ton-miles, total rail traffic measured in ton-miles would be
found to have declined at an average of 0.3 percent a year between 1 947
and 1970 rather than rising at an average rate of 0.2 percent as the BLS
statistics indicate. This, in turn, would reduce the measured labor produc-
tivity gain by one-half of one percentage point per year from the 5.2
percent per year calculated by the BLS to 4.7 percent per year. Of course,
if one were to count a passenger-mile as equivalent to seven or eight
freight ton-miles, the simple labor productivity gain using the BLS index
would be further reduced.
As noted, the use of ton-miles as the unit of freight output may also
overstate the growth of rail output, for the shifts toward lower-value, bulk
commodities, toward larger shipments and longer hauls, all are shifts
toward ton-miles that are inherently less costly to produce. Assuming that
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the relative costs ofdifferent types of freightshipments are roughlyprop tional to their respectiverevenues ti.e., applying the BLSrule for weighting
passenger and freight serviceto weighting differenttypes of freighttraffic which wouldseem more defensible for freightservice since freightmark- ups are probably more uniform),an estimate of the actualincrease in freight outputmay be obtained by deflating totalfreight revenuesby an index of freightrates (say the RI-i freight rateindex computedby the ICC); by so doing,one can at least partially abstractfrom systematicchanges in the composition offreight traffic withrespect to commodity,size of individual shipments, andlength of hauls. Freightoutput measured inthis manner would have risen only0.2 percent peryear between 1947and 1970, one-halfa percentage point less thanthe 0.7 percentper year increase in revenueton-miles.30 If translatedinto an adjustment ofthe BLS productivity statistics,this would reduce themeasured productivitygrowth in the rail industryby another ½ of 1percent per year.Together, thesetwo changs in the outputindexone to weightpassenger servicemore ready in accord with itscontribution to operatingexpenses, the other toaccount for the changingcharacter of freighttraffic.woukl reducethe measured rate of growth in laborproductivity bya full percentagepoint. To the extent thatthe rail industry,like most otherindustries, has substituted capital forlabor in the productionprocess, productivitymay also be bettermeasured formany purposes byendeavoring toconstruct combined or multiplefactor productivityindices. Specifically,Kendrick, in a study of productivitytrends in theAmericaneconomy, defines whathe calls "total factorproductivity" whichtakes intoaccount increasesin capital as wellas labor inputs.3'
Indexes of laborand capitalare weighted togetherin the Kendrickstudy "on the basis ofthe labor andproperty shares ofnational incomeoriginat- ing in the railroads
as estimated by theOffice of Business
Economics."32 The propertyshare of capitalin nationalincome, however,corresponds to profits, andinasmuch as therate of profit in thehighly regulatedrailroad industry is relativelylow, theproportionate level ofcapital inputs couldbe understated by theKendrick procedure.As pointedout in Section 1,the rate of returnon net investment(original costless depreciation)in rail transportationproperty has averagedonly about 3percent during the postwar period. Thisis only halfthe 6 percentreturn that the l.CChas traditionally takenas a desirablestandard for therail industry andonly one-third the9 percentto 10 percentor more after-taxreturn that is perhapsmore "normal"throughoutnon-regulatedprivate industry. It could beargued, therefore,that productivitymeasures for the rail industry mightbe morenearly comparablewith unregulatedsectors if capital inputswere accordedtwo to fivetimes the weightthat is accorded them in theKendrick study.(On the otherhand, ofcourse, Kendrickcanargue that all of his indices are constructed using the same definitions in all
industries SO that inter-industry comparability is thereby improved.) Ken-
drick affords capital inputs a weighting of roughly 10 percent and labor
inputs a weighting of 90 percent during the period 1950 to 1966. The
effect of a heavier weighting of capital inputs on the measured growth of
Kendrick's total factor productivity would be to reduce it by three-tenths of
a percentage point for each doubling of measured capital inputs; thus, with
a 75-25 weighting instead of Kendrick's 90-10, total productivity growth
from 1948 to 1966 would drop from Kendrick's estimate of 5.2 percent to
4.7 percent.33
Alternative Measures of Rail Productivity
Total rail output, for purposes of calculating the growth of factor productiv-
ity, has been, as we have seen, traditionally a weighted combination of
revenue freight ton-miles and revenue passenger-miles. However, the
growth of freight traffic might be better represented not as the growth of
physical ton-mileage, for reasons advanced earlier, but as the growth of rail
freight revenues measured in constant or deflated dollars, There is also the
question of how to combine passenger traffic with freight traffic in order to
arrive at a measure of totalrail output. Using the convention that a
passenger-mile is equivalent to five revenue freight ton-miles (to reflect the
relative cost of producing passenger-miles vs. ton-miles), railroad output
for the years 1947 and 1970 could be measured as follows:
Total inputs to the rail industry consist of labor, capital, and purchased
materials and supplies. For productivity measures, each input, like each
output, should be measured in real or constant dollar terms or physical
units or as close thereto as possible. Accordingly, labor input might be
measured as customary by man-hours worked, including straight time and
overtime.35
For capital inputs the measurement problem is considerably more com-
plex. Fortunately, the Bureau of Accounts of the ICC in 1937 reevaluated
all the transportation property (other than land and landrights) of the
railroads; they concluded that the cost of reproducing the rail system
1947 1970
Freight servicein ton-miles (billions) measured
in constant rail freight dollars 655 689
Passenger service in equivalent ton-miles-
passenger-miles (billions) x 5 230 54
Total output in ton-mile equivalents (billions) 885 743
Total output index (1947 = 100) 100 84.0











































TABLE 7Capital Stock, Owned by Railroads and Employed in Produc-






SOURCES:Kendrick, Productivity Trends in U.S. Transportat ion lndustties. (prepared for the Office of the
Under-Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Department of Commerce, January 1966), pp. 8,
31 -.32; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current ffusiness, June 1956 and March
issue of 1958 and subsequent years.
excess of gross capital expenditures above depreciation inthe financial
accounts of the railroads may not reflect net physical additions tothe
capital stock so much as the rise in the cost of replacing assets over their
original cost.36
The preceding estimates of the rail-owned capital stock exclude land
and landrights. It is estimated that railroads occupy roughly 3 million acres of
rural land and 300,000 acres of urban land, only slightly changed between
1947 and 1970.Assigning value to these lands at the rate of $100 per
rural acre and $10,000 per urban acre, roughly corresponding to the





















1 967 52.1 55.9
1968 51.9 58.8
1969 51.9 61.8
1970 51.8 65.3John R. \le,t'r ,ni(i\l\1flhICr L
the railroad investmentin land woul(J beestimated at S 3 3bll,0 1957-1959 prices.
Finally, as mentionedconsiderable growth hasoc( urreciin(a,)jtui inputs from plant andequipment that are emplosecliii ProducingrjiI output but not owned by the railroadcompanies and therefore
O\cI1I(Id from the precedingcapital inputs. Duringrecentears, Outl,cOn )rft freight cars by other thanrailroad OperatingCompanic's have be
running $300 to $500 millionper year, or roughlyone-quarter to one-thirdthe tot gross capital expenditures of theoperating cOmpaniesthenisefveç Alack of historical dataon such outlays preventsarriving at anCstimate of the total stock by cumulationso instead that valuemust be esti'nd
b capitalizing the annual rentalcharges, as is cloneto a roughapproxin7j in Table 8.
The ICC reportsannual rental charges forequipment and iointl'Oper- atedfacilities, Ofequipment rental charges, iccfigures suggestthat roighlv 30 percent
represent maintenance leak ingthbalanc topay tgr interest and deprecitjonAs the hulk of theserental chargesare for equipment a 4 percentrate ot annual depreciationì2S-ear lit)can assumed Theaverage yield on equipmentobligations about3 Percent in 1947 and 6percent in 1970, is usedas the approprj,iterate of interest These estimates implythat the capitalstock that \ieldedS 3 1million in
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41,()in rental charges (net of maintenance) in1947 had a value of approximately
$1.9 billion, whereas the capital stock thatyielded $557 million in rental
tal charges in 1970 had a value ofapproximately $5.6 billion.° Converting
all these estimates to constant 1957-1959dollars by the ICC's railroad
ed construction cost index, the constant-dollarcapital stock of externally
owned rail plant and equipmentcan be estimated as growing from $2.83
ng billioii 1957-1959 dollars in 1947to $4.56 billion in 1970. When inputs
tal of both railroad-owned and externallyowned plant and equipment are
ck taken together, the striking aspect is theoverall stability of the total capital
he stock used in the U.S.railindustry in the postwar years. Moreover,
by whatever increase has occurred, apparently hasconsisted largely of exter-
on nally owned assets.
In Table 9, the rate of growth of railinputs and outputs, as calculated
r- from the statistics just presented,are summarized. Crude estimates of the
at rates of growth of rail labor productivity and rail capitalproductivity can
or be determined by subtracting therate of input growth from the rate of
or output growth. Labor productivity in the rail industry,by this measure
)e (using the figures of Table 9),grew at an average rate of 3.7 percent per
in year. Although this figure is substantially lower than the 5to 6 percent rate
t. of growth in labor productivity estimated by theBLS and Kendrick in their
in studies, it stillis above the reported rate of growth in labor productivity
in the entire private domesticeconomy, which has averaged 3.0 to 3.1
percent per year during these same years. This isa surprising record of
accomplishment for an industry that has suffered decliningoutput, with the
result that increases in labor productivity havenecessitated a rather rapid
contraction of the labor Iorce.'
An important factor in this comparativelyrapid growth of rail labor
productivity is almost certainly the substitution that hasoccurred of capital







Output 100 84.0 0.7
Inputs
Labor 100 36.2 4.4
Materials and supplies 100 45.7 3.4
Capitalrail-owned ioo 100.2 0.0
Capitalexternal ioo 172.4 2.4
Capilalrail-owned plus
external ioo 104.3 0.2
to The U.S. Railroad Industryin the Post-World War II Period: A Profile 477TABLE 10Weightings for Aggregating
Labor, Capital? andIntermediate inputs Rasedon Contribution of Eachto Total Rail
Operating Costs,1947 and 1 970
(all figures inmillions of eurreiztdollars)
tn the case of labor,
purchased materials andsupplies, and externalcapital, the contributionto total Costs
is equated to actual
outlays. The cost ofrail-owned capitalinputs, however, is takenas depreciationequal
to 2.5 percent of
reproduction cost lessaccrued depreciation(in current dollars) plus
interest charge equal
to 3 percent in 1947and 6 percent in1970 of reproduction
cost less depreciatior',
(in current dollars),
for labor,as depicted strikinglyin Table 10.Although outputhas declined, total capitalinputs haveactually increasedslightly, implyingin simplistic terms a negativerate of capital
productivity growth.2 Rather thancalculating eitherlabor productivityor capital productivity, the changein productivityfor all factorscould bemeasured. In orderto
calculate thegrowth of multiple
factor productivity,it is firstnecessary to determine withwhat weightslabor, capital,and any otherinputs should be combined. Itis clear thatthe moreheavily laborinputs (whichhave
declined)are weightedrelative to capitalinputs (whichhave beenstable or increased slightly),the greaterwill be themeasured rateof productivity gain, and viceversa, Thetheoreticallymost defensibleweightingproce-
dure is probablyto weight eachclass of input
according to itscontribution
to totalcosts; that is,the larger,more costlya certain class ofinput, the more heavily itshould beweighted. Theproblem withthis strategyis that
as the proportionin whichthe variousinputs arecombined hschanged
over the years,the proportionin whicheach inputcontributes to totalcosts
has presumably
changed also.Thus, theactual weightsdepend on theyear
of observation.
Fortunately,inputproportionsmeasured inphysical units





%of %of Amount Total CostsAmount TotalCosts
Labor (includingpayroll
taxes & weltare benefits) $4986 55 $6400 44 Materials & supplies
1,909 21 1,636 II External capital
171 2 777 5 Ra (-owned capital(excluding
land) see Table8 (34000) (65300) Depreciation
850 10 1633 11 Interest






$8,996 100 $14,574 100I
factor substitution), with the result that their proportions intotal cost
change less sharply than their proportions in physical units.
The contributions of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs to total
operating costs in the years 1947 and 1970 are shown in Table 11.
sts Whereas the substitution among capital and intermediate inputs as against
labor has moved steadily in one direction between those years, it may be
assumed that the weightings developed using those two extremes are the
extremes of the various weightings that would result from using inter-
mediate years. Using the weighting scheme based on the input costs
analysis for 1947, in which year labor and intermediate inputs were used
rather intensively, multiple factor productivity in the rail industry grew at
an average rate of 2.4 percent per year from 1947 to 1970; using the 1970
weights, in which year capital inputs were used rather heavily, overall rail
productivity grew at an average rate of only 1 .5 percent per year. These
estimates compare with a 2.5 percent rate for combined labor and capital
productivity in the entire private domestic economy during this same
period.43
In sum, the railroad industry may not be achieving the high rates of
ual productivity growth often claimed for it. Much of the statistical gain in rail
r). labor productivity owes simply to the decline of passenger traffic,of
less-than-carload traffic, or traffic in manufactures, and of short-haul traffic,
with the resulting shift in the composition of rail traffic toward heavy-
loading, bulk commodities, and longer hauls, which are inherently less
d, labor-intensive. Compensating for the changing character of traffic reduces
tic the growth rate of labor productivity to a level that is close to the average
throughout industry.
ty, This growth of labor productivity has also been accompanied by some
to replacement of labor inputs by capital and other inputs. Annual productiv-
to ity growth for all factors in the rail industry has perhaps averaged only 1 .5
be percent to 2.5 percent during the postwar period. This record is approxi-
ye mately the same or somewhat lower than the comparable productivity gain
or in most other industries, though not adverse compared to what might be
ity expected in a declining inrtry c railroading.44
Ce-
ion
he [4] THE RAILROAD FINANCIAL SITUATION REVISITED
at
ed For a number of reasons, the standard reports on net railway operating
sts income often are regarded by financial and other observers of the industry
ear as being potentially misleading. They are, of course, prepared to ICC
its specifications and in many respects conform to accounting procedures
to found elsewhere in industry. However, some ICC procedures predate the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































emergence of modern accounting practices and are therefore at some
variance with current accounting conventions.
Unquestionably, the largest number of questions about railroad account-
ing pertain to the handling of depreciation expenses or the capital asset
accounts. For example, many suspect that the depreciation accruals,
computed by standard ICC methods, underestimate the true degree of
capital consumption in the industry. Other reservations about railroad
depreciation figures originate in the fact that railroad equipment isas-
sumed to have an uncommonly long average physical life by the standards
of modern industry (usually in the range of twenty to sixty years). When
coupled with the obvious fact of considerable inflation in costs in the U.S.
economy over the last few decades, these long lives for depreciation could
under certain assumptions (and particularly in a slow-growing industry)4s
result in cash flows from depreciation that are inadequate to finance
current replacement needs.
The rail industry, as explained in section 1, has for some time experi-
enced a stable volume of traffic and seems to have limited prospects for
future growth. In such an environnient, it is difficult to believe that current
gross capital expenditures would consistently run above a level needed to
do more than maintain current output. In fact, the capital committed to the
industry, as developed in the calculations reported in section 2, does
indeed seem to have been more or less constant over the last couple of
decades. More precisely, if one concentrates only on that capital owned by
the industry itself and therefore subject to depreciation on the books of the
industry, the total committed capital has actually declined somewhat in
recent years.
This suggests that a somewhat truer picture of the earnings situation in
the rail industry might he achieved by substituting gross capital expendi-
tures for depreciation accruals in computing net railway operating income.
The standard objections to such a procedure, applicable in almost any
other industry, that gross capital expenditures not only Provide for the
replacement of depreciating assets but also for additional assets necessary
for the expansion of the business (and therefore cannot realistically be
charged off as costs of business in the year incurred), would not necessarily
be as applicable in an industry as stable (or even declining) as the railroad
industry. Moreover, though gross capital expenditures in the U.S. railroad
industry have run substantially above depreciation charges, there is some
evidence that the quality of the equipment and property committed to
railroading may actually have deteriorated somewhat in recent years; for
example, there is much comment on a continuing so-called shortage of
freight cars and an undeniable increase in the instances of derailnlent.46
Consequently, gross capital expenditures, as much in excess of deprecia-
tion charges as they are, may themselves be a conservative estimate of the
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investment in all but three years since 1964, even before fixed charges are
pc',J.
The financI viability of the industry depends ultimately, ofcourse, on
its ability to meei these fixed charges. The fixed charges of the railroad
industry have increased markedly over the past decade, from $367 million
as recently as 1963 to $601 million in 1971.48 The upward march of fixed
charges owes to a combination of advancing interest rates in the capital
market plus the increased debt of the railroad industry. Despite the stable
volume of rail traffic, gross capital expenditures have exceeded internal
cash flows (depreciation plus net income) less cash dividends inevery year
since 1960, thus requiring an addition to borrowed capital and greater
fixed charges.
Net income, the residuum of total income left after paying fixed charges
and miscellaneous deductions from income, is the amount of income
remaining for distribution to equity holders as dividends or for re-
investment in the business. The gradual decline of total income and the
rising level of fixed charges imply that net income has trended downward,
as Table 13 indeed shows. Although net income has been falling, the total
cash dividends paid out by ClassI railroads have been increasing during
the last decade, to the extent that dividends paid during 1970 and 1971
exceeded net income for the system as a whole.However, if the deficits
in net income of the six northeastern railroads are added back into the net
income of all ClassIrailroads, the dividend payout ratios for 1970 and
1971 are reduced to 68.7 percent and 57.8 percent for those years.
Clearly, the financial condition of the railroad system as an entity is less
than robust. The cash flows of the industry (net railway operating income
plus depreciation) are barely sufficient to provide for capital maintenance if
that is measured by gross capital expenditure rather than depreciation, let
alone to provide a competitive rate of return on invested capital. Further-
more, cash flows have been stable or trending slightly downward, whereas
the amount of money invested, and therefore the costs of amortization and
interest, have been rising.
An intriguing question is why monetary investment has continued at
such a high or even expanding level in a declining or stagnant industry,
earning such low rates of return. A high rate of reinvestment in an industry
with a low average rate of return is understandable, of course, if thenew
investment is expected to earn a high marginal rate of return. Unfortunate-
ly, continuing increases in the dollar value of railroad assets have been
accompanied thus far by a fairly stable level of cash flows (railway
operating income plus depreciation) and by a continuing low level or even
decline in the average rate of return. The claim of high marginal returns
can only be supported, then, by maintaining that although new invest-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































offset the impact of the new investmentson the average rate of return.50 But
beyond some point, the erosion of thereturn on aging assets can no longer
be ignored in claiminga high marginal return on new investments. Itis
therefore significant that even if all the earnings of all the capital employed
in the rail industry (i.e., net railway operating income)were attributed to
the gross capital expenditures of the precedingten years alone, the rate of
return in 1970 would have been only 3.7 percent, in 1971, 5.2percent,
and in 1972, 5.9 percent. These rates, although higher thanoverall rates
for the rail industry, still are low comparedto industry in general.
Continuing reinvestment in railroad property alsomay reflect the ab-
sence of alternative uses for the funds available to the railroads. Regula-
tion, in particular, has impeded withdrawal of fundsor diversification
"out" of railroading. The common-carrier obligation of railroads enforced
by the ICC and the specific prohibition of line abandonment and related
forms of disinvestment may sometimes have caused the railroadsto
reinvest despite low anticipated returns.51 Given that railroadmanagement
is committed (whether by choice or by regulatory compulsion)to remain-
ing in the traditional railroad business, simply doingso necessitates a
continuing high level of investment.52 If rail service is to be provided,new
cars must be purchased as old cars wear out and as traffic grows, and so
on. The rising monetary cost of replacements in an inflationary economy
contributes to the growing dollar investment in railroad property. Further-
more, railroad equipment is depreciated on its original cost rather than its
cost of reproduction, arid the service lives of railroad assets arecompara-
tively long, so the cost of replacing them is usually considerably inexcess
of depreciation based on historical costs. Thismay be offset to some extent
by technological innovations, but itis doubtfulif this offset is total or
complete for the railroad industry.
Of course, if the sum of gross capital expenditures plus cash dividends
exceeds cash flows (net income plus depreciation),an industry must rely
on external funds. Table 13 shows the volume of external funds that the
rail industry has succeeded in attracting in recent years.63 In view of the
chronically low average rate of returnon capital invested inrailroad
property and of the apparent withdrawal of equity capital through divi-
dends, this ability to raise outside debt is rather remarkable.
One apparent explanation for the relative ease with which external funds
have been raised is to be found in their form. The largestcategory of
external funds shown in Table 13 is "equipment debt." Equipment debt
comes in two primary categories, equipment trusts and conditional sale
contracts (or deferred payment contracts).54 In cases in which neither
equipment trusts nor conditional sale contracts are feasible, the long-term
lease provides a third method of raising external funds for rolling stock.
Equipment debt has been made available to the railroad industry be-
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cause of the near perfect security or collateral that the equipment
provides to the creditor. "A history of equipment trusts," in thewords of OneCxper "indicates practically zero risk to holders. TheSecurity is readilyrepo5
sessed and, if necessary, resold. Considering that thecar life is more Iikef
30 years than 15, the market value from date of issueis greater thanthe indebtedness generally. Thus there isno risk premium.Anotherattractive feature of equipment debt is the seniority of theclaims onearnings of the
creditors compared to the claims of bondholdersand stockholdersThe power of repossession puts the claims of thoseunderwriting equiprn00,
trusts and conditional sale contracts ahead of thoseholding thefunded debiTogether, the seniority of claims and theliquidity andmobility of the collateral have provided the railroadswith a largesource of external
funds in equipment debt; these funds,moreover, have been madeavail. able to the railroad industry atvery favorable interest ratesInterest rateson rail equipment obligations havetended to be equalor slightly lowerthan yields on AAA corporate bondsand rates on conditionalsaleagreements have been only slightly less thanhalf a point highcr.'
One not totally incidentalconsequence of the substitution ofequipme debt for funded debt andequity capital is that it hasalready substantially complicated the problem ofreorganizing railroads in bankruptcyCapital costs as a proportion of total railwayoperating "expenses" inthe years 1925, 1935, and 1970are shown in Figure 1.Traditionallyreorganiza. tions have succeeded bychanging the capitalStructure to reduce debt service costs to a pointat which operatingrevenues can reasonably be expected to cover them.Equipment debt cannotnecessarily he written down in thisway, ifthe creditors preferto exercise theiroption to repossess. Thus itis only the claims ofholders of funded debtand of lessors of fixed plantthat can be reducedin this manner. Figure1 shows that, as a result of thesubstitution of equipmentdebt for funded debtand equity, the proportionof capital costs thatmight be easily voidedby bankruptcy has declinedgreatly. Comparedto 11.4 percent of totaloperat- ing costs in 1925and 18.5percent in 1935, readilyvoidable capital costs for the industryin 1970 comprisedonly 3.0percent of total operating expenses Hence, the bankruptcycourts presently havea much narrower margin within whichto work than duringearlier rounds of railroad bankruptcies.
In short, the railroadindustry hascontinued to maintain itsinvestment in railroad Propertyand hasmanaged to attractnew external debt to fund these capitalexpenditures, despitea low rate of returnon invested capital. In essence, theindustry has toSome extent substituteddebt for equity and leases andconditional salesagreemenfor debt in its financialstructure. in the longrun, obviously,some limit must existto the extent to which an industry canattract relatively cheapcapital by usingmore senior forms of financing therebysubordinating olderdebt.FIGURE 1Capital "Rents" (Excluding Equity Capital)
Percentage of total cost
(revenue less profit and loses)
[5J SUMMARY
The evolution of the freight market has created serious problems for the
railroad industry. Aggregate intercity freight traffic (of altcarriers) has
grown less than two-thirds as fast as real GNP during the postwar period,
and traffic of a type suited to conventional rail transport hasgrown still
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john R, Meyer andAiexander L.Morton
pipeline transport,have narrowed thenumber of freightmarkets inwhith rail service holdsa cost and serviceadvantage, furthercircumscribing growth.
Conventional and widelyused measures ofrailroadproductivity,such as "ton-miles per man-hour,"indicate that railproductivity hasgrown ata rate of 5-6 percenta year during recent
decades, considerablyabove the average 3.0 percent growthof labor productivityin the privateeconony during thesesame decades. However,using alternative
assumptions and measures (e.g., allowingfor changesin the compositionof railtraffic), it can be argued thatthe growth inrail-labor productivityhas beenonly about 3.7percent. Capital inputsto the railroadindustry havenot declined nearly so rapidlyas labor inputs,so that the indicatedcrudeproductivity growth rate forrail capital isnear zero. Whenlabor, capital,and other inputs are weightedtogether, productivityin the industrymay havegrown only about 1.5to 2.5 percentper year duringrecent decades,a productiv- ity growthrate at or slightlybelow the 2.5percent peryear rate forthe privateeconomy as a whole.
The financialcondition of therailroad industryreflects thesluggish growth of trafficand productivity.On many grounds,in fact, the3 percent or so overallaverage rate of returnon transportation
operations reportedby
U.S. Class Irailroads, usingconventional ICCaccountingtechniques,may be anoverstatement. Trendsin railroadoperating incomeand capital expenditures alsopoint towarda possible further
deterioration inthe railroads'financial condition.
In short, theU.S. railroadindustry sufferssevere problems.This doesnot necessarilymean, though, thatthe industrycan never berestored asan efficient,competitive, profitable






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3494 John R. Meyer rind AlexanderL. Mort0n
NOTES
The income statements a Class I railroads combined furtlit' l% to 1970are given in Appendix Table A.
Operating income is computed net of payments for hired equipment and jointfasjlisj05
Payments for hired equipment have risen rapidly during the past decade from
$3 million in 1960 to $816 million in 1971cf. section 4>.
Net investment represents original cost, less depreciation and amortization,
accrued under the accounting regulations of the ICC. The return on investment is
consistent with
respect to hired equipment (e.g., private cars> in that payments for hired equipment
are charged off as expenses before net operating income is computed, whilethe valueI
this equipment is not included in the net investment accounts. The effectof this partial
exclusion of capital is to leverage the rate of return shown in Table
1more highl>
The charge is frequently leveled that the net investment figures shown inTable Iare inappropriate as a rate base because they include economically obsolete
assets and
much over-valued real estate. In defense of the net investment figure, itshoijl] be noted
(1) that the most blatant cases of historical over-valuation h-ave been
removed b
write-downs in a series of bankruptcy proceedings that swept the railroad
inductry in the
thirties;(2) that in 1963 the commission (1CC> issued an order which
required all
railroads to adjust their corporate books and substitute the adequately
supported cost of
property figures shown in the valuation records in place of the rejected
historical Costs;
and (3) that gross capital expenditures on rpadwaystructures and equipment between
1947 and 1972 alone have totaled $30.8 billion,or more than 85 oercent of thegross
investment in transportation property recorded on the generalbalance sheet for 1972
See 3391CC 164, in which the commission defends theexisting valuation of assetsasa rate base.
First Natsonal City Bank of New York, MonthlyLetter, April 1973.
Both net railway operating income and net investmentin transportation property (and,a
fortiori, rate of return on investment) are affected by thefact that most railroadsuse
retirement accounting rather than depreciationaccounting to writeoff certain categories
of investments in road and structure, suchas grading, tunnels, rails, ties, and ballast
With retirement accounting, these assetsare carried on the books at full value (original
cost) and written off only when they are retired,Replacements of rail, ties, ballast, and
other assets subject to retirementaccounting are charged to operatingexpenses; ie.,
written off in the year in which theexpenses are incurred.
Without detailed analysis,itis not possible to say svhether theuse of retirement
accounting results in net railway operatingincome and net investment being higheror lower in the long run than they wouldbe if conventional depreciationaccounting were
used. It is probable, whichever is thecase, that the level of net operating income and the
level of net investment wouldbe changed in the same directron,so that their quot:ent (rate of return on investment) wouldnot be much affected in the longrun by the choice of accounting technique.One railroad, the Chicago andNorthwestern, recently con- verted fromretirement accounting to depreciationaccounting: reported net income during the first eight monthsunder depreciation accountingwas about $5 million higher than it would have beenunder retirement accounting. Thatis. the increase in deprecia-
tion accruals was more thanoffset by the decline inexpenses as outlays on track ceased to be recorded as currentexpenses. However, therewas a major write-down in asset value at the time ofconversion from retirement accountingto depreciation accounting so that depreciation accrualsincreased less than they wouldhave otherwise One effect of retirementaccounting is to givemanagement greater control over te level of profitsreported in any particular

















































and-tear to assets subject to retirement accounting in anyparticular year is essential!y
the replacement expenditires in that particular year. Somanagement can control or
vary the annual cost of assets subject to retirementaccounting in the short run by
varying the level of replacement expenses.
A large number of assets do not require periodic replacementand are carried on the
railroads books at original cost. One financial analyst estimatesthat the rail industry
carries about $3.5 billion worth of gradings and tunnels on itsbooks in this way and that
railroad cash flows would increase by $65 to $75 millionannually were Congress to
permit the railroads to amortize these investments and,thereby, reduce their income tax
liabilities. See Pierre S. Bretey. Railroad Industry Review (NewYork: Reynolds Securities,
Inc., 1972), p.29. Of course, for railroads operating ala loss orhaving no tax liability for
other reasons, amortization of presently nondepreciable assetswould have no material
value.
See Alexander L. Morton, 'Freight Demand," Ph.D. dissertation,Harvard University, 1973
(unpublished), Chapter 5. 'Sand, gravel, and stone" is actually thelargest category of raw
material consumption in terms of weight, as Table I indicates,and has also been the fastest
growing during the postwar period, owing to theacceleration of highway construction,
which uses these materials intensiveiy. However, sand,gravel, and stone for direct use in
construction tend to move very short distances in largevolumes and to rely on specialized
private carriage, thereby making disproportionately smalldemands on the general transport
system.
The case of food illustrates this point. Although per capitaexpenditures on food rose
from $405 in 1950 to $491 in 1970 (in constant 1967 dollars),the weight of food
consumed per capita, as measured by the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, fell from
1,506 pounds in 1950 to 1,449 pounds in 1970.
This increasing decentralization and market orientation ofproduction is documented in
studies by B. Chinitz and V. Fuchs. See 13. Chinitz, Freight and theMetropolis (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 114-115; and V. Fuchs, Changes inthe Location of
Manufacturing in the United States Since 1929 (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1962),
pp. 292-293. In many instances someform of processing of the raw material occurs at or
near the raw material source, but theresulting intermediate good to be transported is
usually stillin bulk commodity form.
Freight rates on bulk commodities have declined more rapidlythan (or not increased so
much as) those on manufactures (see Chinitz, 1960 (Note 9), pp.119-120). This owes in
part to the lower labor intensity of transportingbulk commodities, and in part to the
practice of value-of-service pricing, which encourages a greatermark-up over costs on
the higher valued manufactures.
Morton, 1973 (see note 7), Table X, p. 91.
Morton, 1973 (see note 7), Table X, p. 91.
For example, in producing automobiles, machinery,instruments, and other metal
products, metals may be transported as many asthree or four times in one form or
another (ore, sheet metal, stamping, subassembly)before leaving the final factory as a
finished product.
Morton, 1973 (see Note 7), Chapter 3.
The mechanization, computerization, and "routinization"of industrial production and
distribution raise the allowable premium for reliable del:veries. In fooddistribution, for
example, handling the routine shipment has become almostcostless to the consignee
compared to the lost, delayed, damaged, or otherwiseexceptional shipment.
See L. W. Weiss, "The Survival Technique and the Extent ofSuboptimal Capacity,"loumal
of Political Economy, June 1964, pp. 246-261, especiallyTable 1, p. 249.
This tendency for regional economies to acquire their ownproduction capacity in a
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wider variety of manufacture as the size of the market expands is known in
international
trade a"import substitution.'
Not only are individual cities becoming larger, but urban growth seems to 1w'
q-
trated in a limited number of metropolitan belts, such as those extending from Bst10
to
Norfolk, from San Francisco to San Diego, from Miami to Jacksonville and
around the.
Great Lakes. These four "nwgalopoli" alone have absorbed almost all the nation's
net
population growth during recent decades; in 197() they included 41.1 percentof th
population and it is estimated they svill include 60.1 percent by 2000. (See Jerome.p
Pickard, Dimensions of Metropolrtanism, Urban Land Institute Research Monograph
14
Washington, D.C., 1967.) As this type of agglomeration continues, even a limited
nunnJ1
of plants producing any one item will be able to supply a majority of consumers
Without
resorting to long hauls to distant markets.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, tjrhan and Rtira/ Arnrin-a.Poiic5
for Future Growth, Washington, D.C., April 1968, p. 3.
See J. R. Meyer, I. F. Kain, and M. WohI, The Urban Transportation Problem(Cambridge
Harvard University Press, 1965), Chapter 2; J. F. Kain, "The E)istributiori and
Movenienioi
Jobs and Industry,'' The Metropolitan Enigma: !fl(;uirieS into tlic' Nature ,ineJDi;flension(
America's "Urban Crisis," James Q. Wilson, cd. (Cambridge: Harvard Universit
Press,
1968); and Edwin Mills, Studies of the Structure of the Urban Economy (Baltimore
Johns
Hopkins Press, 1972), p. 35.
Raw materials and semi-processed goods were brought into cities by railto factories
clustered around the railhead. The products of these factorieswere loaded directly back
Onto railcars for distribution to consumers in other cities and rural markets
Manufac.
lured goods arriving by rail in cities arid towns were easily distributedto consumers who
generally resided relatively close to the businesscore and railhi'ad.
The rate of suburbanization is not uniformamong manufacturing industric's. light
manufacturing has suburbanized the most rapidly sinceitisleast concerned with
high-volume throughputs of commodities (other than fueland electricity), hence. least
dependent on rail service for delivery of inputs and leastlikely to employ rail service fct
delivery of outputs. But it is also light industry thatis growing fastest among manufacti,,r.
ing industries and producing the greatest growthof freight traffic (in terms ofrevenue>
Thus, suburbanization handicaps the railroadsin participating in the faster-growing
sectors of the freight market.
The growth rate of rail labor productivitycalculated in this fashion is, in fact, theeighth
highest among the growth rates for 35 individualindustries calculated by the BLS for the
period 1957-1970, See hidexes of OutputPer Man-Hour, Selected Industries, 1939 and
1947-1970, 31.5 Bulletin 1692, p. 7.
24,John W. Kendrick, Postwar Prodoitis'ityTrends in the Unitedrates, 1948.-1969 (Ness
York. National Bureau of EconomicResearch, 1971), Chapter 5. Outputncr man-hourrose
8.2 percent a year in airtransportation and 9.1 percent a year in pipelinetransport,
however, during thissame period,
Kendrick, 1971 (see Note24),p. 5-8.
Non-railroad freight cars account foran even greater proportion of total investment in
rail freight cars, as privateownership tends to be cunc entrat('danlur,g higher-priced tank
cars, rc'frigerator cars, andcars of special design.
One other consideration thatwould reinforce this bias wouldbe that tht' (JualitV of each man-hour has probablyimproved over theyears because of rising educational levels, etc., though in thecase of railroading this may have beenli'ss than in inrlustry in general because of the relativeaging of IFie rail labor force.
Deferring oneexpense may cause anotherr:ategn)ry of c'xpenst' to rise, thereby partially offsetting the reductionin total costs thatcan behieved by th'fc'rral. For example,tonal
deferred replacement of equipmentcauses higher equipment maintenance expenses;
deferral of track maintenance necessitatesslow orders" that escalate train-crew hours,
etc.
the ICC first assigns expenses thatare 'solely retated" to either freight or passenger
service to their respective service; thencommon expenses are apportioned statistically.
I the "Solely related" passenger serviceexpenses include, therefore, only those expenses that
e could be directly avoided ifpassenger operations were ceased; it does not inilude
14 elements of track maintenance, signalsystem operations, etc., that svoutd be incurred
oh) anyway, though almost surety in lesser amounts ifpassenger service were discontinued.
how Assigning only solely related passengerexpenses to passenger service and all remaining
operating expenses to freightservice,the average cost of passenger Serviceper
ici5 passenger-mile was 6.0 times as great as theaverage cost of freight service per ton-mile C
in 1963, and 6.75 times as great in 1970. Ona "fully-allocated" basis, on the other
ci e hand, passenger service was 8.5 timesas expensive as freight service in 1963 and 8.8
times as costly in 1970.
The index of railroad carload freightrates prepared by the ICC lRI-ll indicates that
carload rates rose 47.5 percent betsveen1947 and 1970. Yet average revenue per wSS,
ton-mile for all freight rose only 32.7percent during this same period. The difference
between these two figures is a rough indicationof the extent to which the coniposition
of rail freight traffic is shifting towardmovements whose rates are tower, presumably ries
because they are less costly to produce. Althoughthis presumption is clearly more dck
accurate for different classes of freight service than forpassenger vs. freight weightings, it fac-
is still of limited validity because of value-of-servicerate structures. ho 31.Kendrick, 1971 (see Note 24), Chapter5.
- 32.John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in U.S. TransportationIndustr;es, prepared for the ight
Office of the Under-Secretary for Transportation,U.S. Department oUommerce, January ith
1966, p. 22.
ast 33.In genera!, as the Kendrick calculations illustrate,many factors influence productivity for
and complicate its measurement. At best, productivitymeasures incorporate an element r-
of art as well as of science, Foran excellent summation of the "state of this art" see S. e).
Fabricant, "Perspectives on Productivity Research,"prepared for the Conference on an ing
Agenda for Economic Research on Prodoctivity,Washington, D.C., April 6,1973.
Sponsored by the National Commissionon Productivity,
hth 34.Rail ton-mileage fluctuates with the business cycle,and these cyclical variations are
the large compared to the secular growth inton-mileage. Consequently, the measured nd growth of rail output varies with the choice ofterminal years. Cyclical fluctuations
during the forties were sizable, The 658 billionton-miles of 1948 represents something ew of a compromise between the wartime high of741 billion ton-miles in 1944 and a
se postwar low of 529 billion ton-miles in the 1949 recession.Were 1949 used as an initial rI. year rather than 1947, rail output (freight and passenger; wouldhave grown hy 0.4
percent per year (1949-1970) rather than declining by 0.7percent per year (1947-
1970). But this is to measure freight growth froma rather deep reessionary losv to a
in near all-time peak,
nk At 765 billion, ton-mileage in 1970was off 3 billion from its former record of 768
billion in 1969, but wefl above the 740 billionton-miles of the 1971 recession, If the
h new record of 778 billion ton-miles in 1972were used, measured rail output (passenger
Is, and freight) would decline by 0.6 percentper year (1947-1972; rather than by 0.7
ral percent per year (1947-1970;.
35.Man-hours paid for have declined at a rate aboutone-tenth of a percentage point less
fly than the annual rate at which man-hours workedhas declined during the postwar
period. Also,it should again be noted, as in Note 27 above,that the quality of
1 he U.S. Railroad Industryii' the Post-'A'orld 'A/arIIPeriod: A Profile 497S
498 John R. Meyer and Alexancltr'. Mo
man-hours may well have improved over time so that even ''n-on-Jmworked"
so unambiguous a term as it might at first seem.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business june
1956 and Marc)1
issue for 1958 and all subsequent years. This series closely parallelsthe grosscapjta expenditures reported by ClassIrailroads through967. Beginning with1963 Ilk Department of Commerce figures appear to include capitalexp(flcljturrs Ofl railr()a()
equipment by other than railroad companies, so in these latteryears the grosscapital expenditures reported by Class I railroads have been used insteadin order to keepthe. series consistent.
The series of gross capital expenditures may understate actualinvestment in railplant and equipment. Because of the use of retirement accountingrather than deprecj05
accounting, replacement and renewal of rail, ties, ballast, etc.,are charged tocurreni expenses and so do not appear in gross capital expenditures,
This Possibility will be invoked in the next section whereit will be suggester) that
grO5S capital expenditures may be a more accuratemeasure of the actual depreciaj0
than the figures shown in the railroads' depreciationaccounts, which reflect originalacqujs1. lion values.
Jack Fawcelt Associations, Inc., CapitalStock Measures forTransportationpreparedforthe Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation,June 1972, Vol. I,p
These estimates are at some variance with thevalue of freight cars owned byship1
and private car lines, which make up most of theexternal capital. The net
investment (purchase price less accrued depreciation) in privatecars was only $3.2 billion in1971 and $0.3 billion in 1947, according to ICCaccounts. See ICC, Transport Statistics
in the United States, Part 9, 1971; and ICC, Selected Statistics fromthe Annual Reports ofOwner5 of Private Cars, 1947.
Another recent study of employment and laborproductivity in the rail industry
proceeds by a different method of analysisto conclusions similar to thosereported here. (Paul H. Banner, The Measurement of Productivityin Rail Transportationa paper for presenta.
tion at the 1973 annual meeting of theAmerican Society of MechanicalEngineers.) That study begins by questioning whether theton-mile is the relevantmeasure of output with regard to railway labor. For example,does one wish to assert thatbecause the movement of a freight car loaded with 100tons of coal rather than 25 tons ofcomputer equipment generates four timesas many net ton-miles for each mileit travels,it represents four times the productivity? Interms of the work effort involved,carloads car-miles, and train-milesare the most appropriate units in whichto measure ssork output in the railindustry. Man-hours of workare disaggregated by employment

















































If the four divisions of the rail labor force are combined according to their respective
shares in total labor compensation, the average annual rate of labor productivity growth
for all railway labor during the twenty-live year period is 2.7 percent per year (Banner
(see above>, p. 10).
The low rate of gain in capital productivity may be seen by comparing output to the
principal forms of capital inputs: freight cars, locomotives, road, and yards. Revenue
freight ton-miles per ton of freight-car capacity increased from 6,280 in 1947 to 6,400 in
1970, an average gain of on'y 0.1 percent per year. Revenue tonnage originated per ton
of freight-car capacity actually declined 16 percent from 14.7 tons in 1947 to 12.4 tons
in 1970. Ton-miles per locomotive in service rose at an average rate of 2.6 percent per
year during this period. Taking miles of road as a proxy for capital investment in railroad
lines other than yards, ton-miles per mile of road grew at an average rate of 0.8 percent
per year. Taking miles of track in yards and sidings as a proxy for investment in yard
plant, freight ton-miles per mile of yard track and siding rose 1.0 percent per year. In
short, it is apparent that capital inputs have not contracted so freely as labor inputs so as
to produce productivity gains.
The choice of terminal years for calculating productivity growth affects the results
somewhat, but not severely. For example, using the record-high year for freight, 1972,
rather than 1970. the growth of total rail output is increased by 0.1 percent per year, and
so total productivity growth is also increased by 0.1percent per year. The most
favorable comparison possible is to measure growth from the rather deep recessionary
iow of 1949 to the all-time high of 1972. Over this interval, measured rail output growth
is 1.0 percent higher, so measured productivity would be almost 1.0 percent higher (i.e.,
reduced somewhat by a rather sharp year-to-year drop in employment in 1949).
A recent study of differential productivity gains among industries concludes that there is
a significant positive correlation between productivity gains and output growth. Cf.
Kendrick, 1971 (see Note 24), Chapter 6. "The relationship is reciprocal: relative
advances in output affect productivity through differential scale economies; and relative
changes inproductivity, mirrored in relative changes in prices of the outputs of the
various industries, in turn affect relative changes in sales and output."
For discussions of some of the issues involved see E.D. Domar,'Depreciation,
Replacement and Growth, and Fluctuations," Economic journal, December 1957, pp.
655-658; E. D. Domar, 'Accelerated Depreciation: A Rejoinder," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, May 1955, pp. 299-304; and R. Eisner,Accelerated Depreciation: Some
Further Thoughts." Quarterly journal of Economics, May 1955, pp. 285-296.
To illustrate deferred maintenance, the total number of train derailments reported to the
FRA Bureau of Railway Safety rose 110 percent between 1961 and 1970, whereas the
number of those derailments attributed to defects or failures or roadway alone rose to
315 percent during the same nine-year period.
II gross capital expenditures are said to equal actual depreciation, then actual net
investment in transportation property is, by definition, unchanged. The net investment in
1950, $24,592 million,is used in calculating the adjusted rate of return in the last
column of Table 12.
These fixed charges are in addition to and subordinated to payments for hired equip-
ment, which have more than doubled from $376 million to $816 million over the same
period.
Rail labor associated with carloads 2.5ct
Rail labor associated with car-miles 2.7%
Rail labor asociatd siih train-miles 4.1%
Ovrliead labor associaied wits a composiie index 1.5%
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Payment of dividends in excess of net income draws down sharehiders' equity,
Shareholders' equity declined from a high of $18.2 billion in 1966 to $16.6 billion in
1971.
In which case, of course, the olc assets should be depredated or written off more
rapidly in the accounts.
The tone of the Conglomerate Merger Studies conducted by the ICC in 1969
that the ICC will scrutinize closely any diveion of funds generated in railroad
operations to non-rail activities, The Conglomerate Merger Studies of the ICCare
reprinted in Failing Railroads, Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Cornmitter,
November 1970, Part 3, pp. 795 et seq.
As an industry, railroading is characterized by strong feelings of pride and traditionan
unusual degree of attachment to the physical property, and by a rather unique historkal
involvement with the regions they serve, all of which contribute to a reluctance
to
disinvest or diversify out of railroading. This reluctance is likely to be amplified
railroad managements that have ascended to their positions through theOnerating
divisions of the railroad and have therefore been cloto the traditions of the rilroJ
The amounts in this table do not include external capital in the form offright cars
supplied by private-car lines. The net investment in railroad cars by private-carowners
has risen from $300 million in 1947 to $3.2 billion in 1971. (See ICC,1971 and ICC,
1947 in Note 40.)
"The equipment trust generally reqies a 20 percent downpaynierit anda l5-year
payout. It is sold on con1pitive bid and approval of issuance is required of theICC, The
condftionaJ sale contract is used not only fornew equipment but for financing the
rebuilding of equipment, where no downpaymentsare involved, or where more than the
customary 15 years is desired. Conditional sale contractsare placed privately and
involve no placement cost. ICC approval is not required." (PaulH. Banner, "Capit?l and
QJtpot in the Railroad Industry," Papers of the TransportationResearch Forum, 1968,pp. 137-138.)
Banner, 1968 (See Note 54), pp. 137-138.Itis believed that only'"ie railroad
equipment mortgage has been defaultedon. In that case, involving the FloridaEast Coast line, the equipment was readily placedelsewhere, confirming the liquidity 01 the
collateral. Of course, if defaultson equipment trusts, conditional salecontracts, and leases should becomemore widespread in the railindustry, the liquidity 01 this
collateral could be considerably lessened.
On the other hand, "the obligationsof the industry for other forms ofinvestment funded debt and equity restupon the earning por of the firm sincevery little can be
reposseserJ and courts have not lookedwith favor upon the disnembermesitof a railroad and public sale of itsparts to satisfy debt. Rather, thecompany in ban&ruy continues in operation with bondholdersreceiving no return. Ultimatelyreorganization and recapitalizatmonoccurs with possible loss to thebondholders." (Banner, 1968 (see Note 54), p. 138.)













































For purposes of Figure1.operating ''expenses'' are defined as railway operating
resenues minus profits and federal income taxes. Capital costs or rents do not intlucle
aiiy i.ut fiji equity capital.
For suggestions and policy recommendations cn how this might be achieved, see
Improving Railroad Productivity, Final Report of the Task Force on Railroad Productivity,
\Vashington, D.C.: National Commission on Productivity. November I 973
The U.S. Railroad Industry in the Post-World War IIPeriod: A Profile 501